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Chapter 11
Resistance and Passive 
Revolution in Egypt and Morocco
Brecht De Smet and Koenraad Bogaert1
The notion of ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’ indicates a loss of neoliberalism’s 
‘hegemonic “aura”’ and a shift towards ‘extraordinary’ modes of governance 
(Bruff 2014: 115). Recent developments of securitization, debt discipline, 
constitutionalization of austerity and coercive policies towards migrants, 
trade unions and other social actors illustrate a shift from traditional bour-
geois democracy to a ‘nondemocratic state’ in the West. It is hard to deny 
the increasing authoritarian policies of governments in the face of the politi-
cal, economic and social problems that flow from the contemporary crisis of 
capitalism. However, in order to understand the nature and direction of the 
development of the state at this juncture, the concept of ‘authoritarianism’ 
has to be grounded in a long-term historical and class-based analysis. If one 
takes the Western post-war period as the norm of capitalist accumulation and 
bourgeois state formation, contemporary neoliberal politics indeed appear 
as an extraordinary, authoritarian deviation. Yet, the history of capitalist de-
velopment since the nineteenth century suggests that revolutions both in the 
global North and in the global South have always showed the limits of bour-
geois democracy and a tendency towards more authoritarian forms of state 
power (Amin 2011). Gramsci, for example, understood the rise of Fascism 
and authoritarianism in the 1920s and 1930s as the ‘normal’ political forms 
of that capitalist epoch (De Smet 2016: 98–99). Instead of the norm, the post–
Second World War class compromise, democratization and welfare state 
were the unique outcomes of ‘extraordinary’ economic and (geo)political 
conditions. This transition represented a ‘counter-revolution in democratic 
form’, which displaced demands for radical change by far-reaching reforms 
of the bourgeois state. A similar argument could be made with regard to the 
postcolonial developmentalist projects in the global South (see below).
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Since the 1970s, neoliberal transformations within global capitalism repre-
sented an evolving and variegating ‘restoration of class power’ (Harvey 2006), 
revealing capitalism’s inner susceptibility to crisis and the coinciding loss of he-
gemonic consensus. However, class power was restored differently in the global 
South as it was in Europe or in the United States. In this chapter we investigate 
the emergence of new forms of authoritarianism in ‘revolutionary’ Egypt and 
‘reformist’ Morocco during the neoliberal age to demonstrate how pre-existing 
forms of authoritarianism are transformed in relation to and converged with 
structural shifts in global capitalism. In other words, how neoliberal reform 
created new forms of capitalist class power in articulation with ‘older’ forms of 
authoritarianism (e.g. neo-patrimonialism, clientelism, state repression, etc.).2 
We argue that, despite a shared global condition of crisis and neoliberal restruc-
turing in the 1970s, divergent national historical trajectories and hegemonic 
policies determined these two countries’ respective vulnerability and resistance 
to revolutionary upheaval. This perspective not only debunks mainstream as-
sumptions linking ‘economic liberalization’ to ‘political democratization’, but 
also rejects the very idea of an ‘impure’, ‘crony’ capitalism in the global South, 
for authoritarian accumulation in these spaces is closely connected to capitalist 
transformation and state reconfiguration in Western liberal democracies.
Furthermore, a closer look at the trajectories of Egypt and Morocco sheds 
light on the varying hegemonic success of neoliberal reform. A shift towards 
more authoritarian policies does not necessarily entail a hegemonic crisis. 
The difference between domination and hegemony is not the quantitative 
proportion between coercion and consent needed to maintain class power, 
but the extent to which force is successfully grounded in popular consent 
(Thomas 2009: 162–165). An authoritarian regime can be quite hegemonic 
if its use of violence, coercion and exclusion is accepted by broad layers of 
the population. Hence, the implementation of neoliberal policies within dif-
ferent national contexts provoked different forms of resistance and produced 
particular political and economic trajectories.
We use Gramsci’s notion of passive revolution as a comparative concept 
to understand the different capacities of Egyptian and Moroccan elites in 
exploiting changes in global capitalism and adapting to popular pressures. 
Passive revolution refers to the capacity of dominant classes in periods of 
crisis and societal transformation to preempt, deflect or absorb revolutionary 
struggles ‘from below’ and reconfigure the state and the economic structure 
‘from above’ to their advantage (De Smet 2016; Gramsci 1971; Morton 2010: 
317–318). Postcolonial state formation could be interpreted as such, as a new 
elite coming out of the liberation movements took over power and neutralized 
more radical revolutionary aspirations, resulting in the developmentalist and 
national bourgeois projects of the Third World (Amin 2011: 102).
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When used as a comparative concept, passive revolution is both encompass-
ing and individualizing (see Tilly 1984). An encompassing comparison ex-
plains the Egyptian and Moroccan cases in terms of their relation to the whole: 
neoliberal transformation. The different cases are presumed to exist not in 
isolation from each other, displaying independent similarities and differences, 
but are considered part of a shared historical process of global and regional re-
configuration and contestation. Such a method of ‘incorporated comparison … 
views comparable social phenomena as differentiated outcomes or moments 
of an historically integrated process, whereas conventional comparison treats 
such social phenomena as parallel cases’ (McMichael 1990: 392).
The comparison between Egypt and Morocco leads us to the conclusion 
that (1) the pace, intensity and momentum of the neoliberal assault; (2) the 
sources and strength of the elites’ hegemony; and (3) the extent and character 
of organized discontent were directly and coherently interrelated, determined 
the capacity of dominant groups to contain popular discontent, and produced 
different political outcomes.
THE END OF DEVELOPMENTALISM AND THE 
REARTICULATION OF AUTHORITARIANISM
In the wake of the decolonization struggles, national liberation movements 
in the global South radically reconfigured the colonial states. Ideologically, 
these postcolonial societal projects shared the outlook of Western Fordism–
Keynesianism, which espoused that the state was the main motor of capitalist 
‘modernization’, that political loyalty had to be assured through some form 
of class compromise and wealth redistribution, and that extreme economic 
liberalism had to be rejected (Amin 2011: 101–102). In the MENA region, 
even though Arab nationalist and socialist regimes expressed this project 
most saliently, both monarchical and republican states could be labelled as 
developmental states with authoritarian yet redistributive policies.
The global economic crisis of the 1970s and the subsequent Third World debt 
crisis spelled the end of developmentalism and opened the door to neoliberal re-
structuring. Under the flag of short-term ‘stabilization’ and long-term ‘structural 
adjustment’, the IMF and the World Bank pushed through the neoliberal restruc-
turing of Third World economies. Privatization became the dominant ‘develop-
ment’ strategy. Within neoclassical and neoliberal discourses this was presented 
as a necessary instrument to ‘roll back’ highly inefficient public enterprise. In 
addition, privatization was also presented as an efficacious weapon against cor-
ruption and clientelist networks as the process dismantled the personal ‘cash 
cows’ of rent-seeking state elites (cf. Walton and Seddon 1994: 334–336). 
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Economic liberalization would then empower new social groups and bring forth 
a political liberalization (cf. Springborg 2011).
However, the project of global neoliberalism failed to live up to its universal-
ist promises of freedom, welfare and individual empowerment. Instead, the dis-
mantlement of welfare and developmentalist state projects and the unrestricted 
movement of global finance capital entailed a growing gap between possessors 
and dispossessed, a switch from class compromise to confrontation and new 
forms of authoritarianism. A new accumulation strategy emerged, based on the 
deregulation of markets, prices and goods; on the flexibility of labour and pro-
duction; on increased transnational competitiveness and on the disintegration of 
collective bargaining in favour of meritocratic individualism which effectively 
undermined the position and strength of labour vis-à-vis capital.
Especially in the MENA region, the move towards privatization was often 
inspired by the severe decline of public revenues, rather than by the inefficiency 
of public enterprises and the superior efficiency of private ones (Ayubi 1997). 
One of the key actors in the neoliberal passive revolution was not the elusive 
market, but state institutions, which actively ‘regulated deregulation’. Those 
who controlled the state also controlled the specific implementation of priva-
tization policies. Consequently, structural adjustment has reinforced, rather 
than weakened, the position of ruling classes. At the same time, the conditions 
were created for foreign capital and new local elites to participate in economic 
restructuring and seize important parts of previously state-dominated economic 
sectors. Authoritarianism in the region was fundamentally transformed by a 
convergence of interests of domestic ruling classes and (global) economic elites 
(Bogaert 2013).
This aggressive confrontation between capital and its discarded social 
base—industrial labour, public sector workers, peasants—did not take place 
without a fight (Walton and Seddon 1994). Social struggle was at the heart 
of these restructurings, and the political future in those days was still very 
open, uncertain and undecided. From the late 1970s onwards, ‘new waves’ of 
protest emerged in the MENA and in the rest of the global South. Urban mass 
protests and riots were among the first expressions of popular discontent with 
the new neoliberal policies (Bayat 2002).
The reconfiguration of authoritarianism in the region was determined 
not only by structural adjustment policies imposed ‘from outside’ by inter-
national creditors, but also by the particular adoption of these schemes by 
incumbent elites and by the social struggles they provoked in different coun-
tries. The cases of Egypt and Morocco illustrate how the global neoliberal 
‘passive revolution’ became articulated in quite different national trajectories 
of political and economic struggle and transformation, respectively provok-
ing and blocking revolutionary outcomes.
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EGYPT’S STALLED NEOLIBERALISM
Looking at Egypt’s history of colonization and decolonization through the 
lens of passive revolution, crucial ruptures appear as attempts by domestic 
ruling groups to reorganize both state and economy in order to reproduce 
their social existence in a context of mass struggle. The 1919 revolution led 
to an unstable compromise between revolutionary actors, domestic elites, 
especially landlords, and British capital. The failure of the ruling coali-
tion to ‘modernize’ Egypt—that is, achieve full independence and political 
democracy, redistribute land and industrialize—led to a persistent crisis of 
hegemony, which was forcefully resolved by a military coup in 1952. In 
the face of a mass uprising the ‘Free Officers’ led by Colonel Gamal Abdel 
Nasser took over control of the state institutions. By leaning on the resistance 
of nationalists, workers and peasants against domestic and foreign elites, 
Nasser was able to conquer state power, but the mobilization of these sub-
altern forces also generated a political debt. In the next two decades a new 
form of authoritarian class rule developed, which, despite the lack of political 
participation and the reliance on state violence, control and surveillance, was 
strongly grounded in popular consent (cf. De Smet 2016). It was generated 
by social reforms, distributive policies, state-led corporatism and a strong 
nationalist and anti-imperialist stance—being at the forefront of the anti-
colonial struggle in the MENA and the global South offered Egyptians a new 
sense of dignity and prestige.
However, already from the second half of the 1960s, discontent among 
workers and students was fomenting over the lack of democracy and failing 
development goals. A falling rate of profit in the second half of the 1960s 
limited the capacity of the Egyptian public sector to redistribute surplus. Con-
sequently, prices and taxes were increased and absolute surplus-extraction 
increased (lengthening of the workweek without compensation, cancellation 
of paid holidays, etc.) (Posusney 1996: 219). Egypt’s defeat in the 1967 Six 
Day War against Israel delivered the fatal blow to the authoritarian project of 
‘Arab socialism’. Increasing subaltern contestation, partly stimulated by the 
May ‘68 students’ and workers’ revolt elsewhere, expressed and stimulated 
the emerging hegemonic crisis of authoritarian Nasserism, years before the 
rise of Islamism in the 1970s (al-Bendary 2008). This leftist turn from below 
was as much a pressing factor for the ruling groups to transform the devel-
opmentalist accumulation strategy and its class alliances as the continued 
economic malaise.
When in 1970 Anwar Sadat succeeded Nasser as president, he tried to 
solve the economic and hegemonic crisis by an increased integration of Egypt 
into the Western-dominated global economy. This reorientation came at a 
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time when the West itself was struggling to solve the problems of Fordist-
Keynesian accumulation. Therefore, together with Pinochet’s Chile, Sadat’s 
Egypt became a laboratory of neoliberalism in the global South (Callinicos 
2011). The Infitah, the opening up of Egypt’s economy to increased for-
eign investment, required sweeping changes to existing class coalitions and 
consent-generating mechanisms, prompting a confrontation with workers, 
students and other subaltern groups. Sadat tried to deflect this conflict in a 
passive-revolutionary way by presenting his changes as a top-down ‘demo-
cratic revolution’ against the authoritarian Nasserist state (Tucker 1978: 6). 
However, despite the establishment of a multiparty system and free elections, 
the ‘deep state’ of the military, bureaucratic and security apparatus remained 
firmly in power—albeit cleansed of Nasserist and Marxist elements. By the 
end of the 1970s, the National Democratic Party (NDP) emerged as the new 
dominant political apparatus of the ruling class coalition. Fundamentally, 
what changed was not the authoritarian character of the state, but its class 
base, excluding subaltern forces such as workers and peasants in favour of 
new layers of private capitalists, consumerist middle classes, international 
capital and transnational actors such as the IMF.
However, the confrontational restructuring of Egypt’s state and economy 
only added to the existing economic and hegemonic crisis. Privatization 
and liberalization of state companies, combined with a high inflation, led to 
deindustrialization, jobless growth, unemployment and a fall of real wages 
(Farah 2009: 39–41). Increasing labour resistance and strikes against these 
measures, temporarily halted due to the 1973 October War, culminated in a 
general uprising or ‘bread riot’ in January 1977 following IMF-imposed aus-
terity measures. Industrial workers in Helwan demonstrated in Tahrir Square. 
Their protests were joined by students and people from the urban lower and 
middle classes.
Sadat’s attempt to present the capitalist class offensive as a process of 
democratization failed to produce a new imaginary that could replace the 
project of Arab nationalism. He increasingly relied on a politicized Islam to 
offer an ideological counterweight to Nasserism. Yet, the repression of the 
1977 uprising and the Camp David negotiations with Israel after the 1973 
October War alienated the president’s Islamist allies as well. Sadat’s failure 
to forge a new hegemony would eventually lead to his assassination by Is-
lamists in 1981.
Under Hosni Mubarak, a much more protracted and appeasing process of 
passive revolution would take place, at least in the 1980s. A new ‘post-populist’ 
class compromise was reached, one which was negotiated on a purely material 
base, without the ideological prestige and mobilization of the Nasserist era. 
Redistributive policies were rooted in an emerging rentier economy. From 
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the second half of the 1970s onwards, a stream of revenues from migrant 
workers’ remittances from the Gulf countries; foreign loans and diplomatic, 
military and economic aid; the re-opened Suez Canal; oil and gas; and tour-
ism rendered a full confrontation with industrial labour unnecessary to drive 
up the rate of profit. Despite a process of deindustrialization the public sector 
continued to expand until the mid-1980s (Richards and Waterbury 2008: 190; 
Roccu 2013). The accumulation of external rents was not the result of smart 
strategy by Egypt’s elites, but the contingent outcome of global and regional 
processes. The geopolitical position of Egypt and its new relation with Israel, 
combined with the rise of the Gulf as an economic powerhouse, temporarily 
created unique opportunities for the dominant groups to reproduce their social 
existence without far-reaching transformations in the economic and political 
structures of the nation.
Mubarak’s early presidency heralded a softening of the coercive dimension 
of state power. Political prisoners were released, civil rights such as freedom 
of press and of association were reinstated to a limited degree and elections 
were held. Liberal commentators praised the country for its gradual ‘democ-
ratization’, but this shift soon proved to be a ‘grand delusion’ (Kienle 2001). 
Although oppositional politics were tolerated in clearly delineated spaces in 
civil and political society, they remained subordinated to the interests of the 
new class coalition that had been established in the 1970s. The relatively suc-
cessful co-optation and subjugation of opposition groups such as the leftist 
al-Tagammu party, the liberal al-Wafd and the Muslim Brotherhood marked 
the consolidation of the Mubarak dictatorship, rather than its undermining. 
Industrial workers, for their part, still associated with Nasserist hegemony 
and continued to interpellate the state as an independent power that defended 
public interest by maintaining a just class equilibrium. They displayed their 
economic productivity and political loyalty to the state in exchange for mate-
rial concessions (Posusney 1996: 233). The state, for its part, could no longer 
rely on a strong hegemony and primarily maintained power by keeping the 
subaltern classes in a fragmented, disorganized and clientelist condition.
The process of gradual neoliberal restructuring in Egypt, moving back 
and forward between measures of economic liberalization and state control, 
highlights that the emerging global neoliberal passive revolution was not a 
homogenizing force, able to simply copy its political, economic and ideologi-
cal structures onto the fabric of Egyptian society. Firstly, the initial speed, 
intensity and confrontational character of the passive revolution provoked 
a strong reaction from subaltern groups who were already revolting against 
authoritarianism and austerity in the late 1960s. Economic concessions to 
avert social explosions such as the 1977 insurrection slowed down the trans-
formative process. Secondly, the influx of windfall rents at the end of the 
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1970s provided the ruling elite with opportunities to actually slow down the 
dismantlement of populist redistribution and maintain the public sector as a 
key economic actor until the 1990s (Bayat 1993: 76–78; Beinin 2001: 157). 
However, new rents were not invested in industry or agriculture, but they 
were spent on imports and subsidies of consumer goods (Richards and Wa-
terbury 2008: 223). A fall in rentier income from 1984 onwards necessitated 
a new accumulation strategy. In the 1990s and 2000s the Mubarak clique 
returned to Sadat’s confrontational policies and aggressively reconfigured the 
post-populist bloc through economic dispossession and state violence.
MOROCCO’S ROYAL PASSIVE REVOLUTION
Morocco did not follow the political path of many of the other states in the 
region (cf. Leveau 1997; Catusse 2008). Whereas the Egyptian pre-capitalist 
landowners played the role of a ‘comprador’ elite, often allying themselves 
with British imperialism against local nationalist forces, the Moroccan sultan-
ate was drawn into a confrontation with French imperialism, leading to the 
exile of Mohammed V in 1953. As a result, the nationalist party Istiqlal (Inde-
pendence) allied itself with the monarchy in a concerted struggle for indepen-
dence and used the popularity of King Mohammed V to gain popular support.
In the power struggle that evolved afterwards, the monarchy eventually 
gained the upper hand. Deploying its traditional and anti-colonial prestige 
and instigating the fragmentation of nationalist forces through the formation 
of a multiparty system, the monarchy was able to position itself symbolically 
above party politics, supervising the political scene as a ‘supreme arbiter’ 
(Waterbury 1970). The monarchy did not construct a mobilizing myth around 
regionalist or universalist notions of Arab nationalism or socialism, but pre-
sented itself as a particular, Moroccan institution that was at the heart of the 
nation and the religion of its people—an authentic, historical institution with 
the king as the ‘Commander of the Faithful’ (Hinnebusch 2014: 14; Water-
bury 1970).
While most Arab countries implemented policies to promote rapid industri-
alization often at the expense of the agricultural sector, the monarchy actively 
developed and prioritized the agricultural sector. The palace saw a stable rural 
landowning class as one of the essential foundations of its power base (Pen-
nell 2000: 306). As such, it also tried to limit the political weight of the cities 
and the urban nationalist movement. Similarly, as the army personnel con-
sisted mainly of soldiers from rural and Berber descent, the military declared 
its allegiance to the monarchy instead of the mostly urban Arab nationalists 
(Vermeren 2002).
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Whereas regional heavyweights such as Egypt, Syria, Algeria, Libya and 
Iraq eventually turned to the Soviet Union for support, Morocco aligned itself 
to the West from the start. The United States and especially France became its 
most important allies. In contrast to other Arab countries that ended up with 
some form of state-led accumulation, Hassan II preferred a controlled liberal 
economic system. State intervention in the Moroccan economy during the 
1950s and 1960s was dictated more by neo-patrimonial strategies, clientelism 
and the structural weakness of the domestic private sector than by a populist 
developmentalist strategy (Ben Ali 1997; Kaioua 1996; Waterbury 1970).
However, at the end of the 1960s a slackening rural economy, increasing 
popular discontent and several cracks within the ruling bloc forced the mon-
archy to change its political strategies and its social base (Joffé 1988). The 
urban riots of 1965 in Casablanca marked a first turning point in authoritar-
ian rule. They could be considered as a precursor of the austerity protests of 
the 1980s. The riots were severely repressed and prompted King Hassan II, 
who succeeded his father in 1961, to dissolve parliament and install a five-
year state of emergency. However, two failed military coups in 1971 and 
1972 rooted in the increasing political and economic tensions in the country 
demonstrated that mere repression was not going to be enough (Hinnebusch 
2014: 16).
Economic windfalls (notably a rise in the export prices for phosphate), 
foreign aid (including from Saudi Arabia) and international bank loans even-
tually gave the monarchy leverage to develop and expand developmentalist 
policies in order to establish a more stable political equilibrium with the 
working classes, the emerging urban middle class and a growing group of 
educated youth in the cities (Glasser 1995; Richards and Waterbury 2008: 
201–202, 243–248). Especially the oil boom of 1973 caused a strong increase 
in the international export prices of phosphates and provided the government 
with considerable resources for public spending. With the 1973–1977 Eco-
nomic Plan, the monarchy gradually shifted its priorities from rural to urban 
regions. Economic rents were invested in the expansion of the public sector 
and redistributed some of the national wealth through public employment. 
Moreover, the monarchy also tried to strengthen the private sector, which 
was still considered the backbone of the economy. Apart from the imple-
mentation of several protectionist measures (e.g. import taxes and licences), 
a Moroccanization law was issued in order to secure at least 50 per cent of 
Moroccan ownership in domestic firms and promote an emerging corpo-
rate class (Cherkaoui and Ben Ali 2007). With the Moroccanization of the 
economy, the monarchy explicitly sought to deepen and strengthen its ties 
with the urban bourgeoisie while it encouraged the controlled emergence of 
a capitalist elite under the wings of a guardian state. As a result, access to the 
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state apparatus and state favours became a necessary condition for success in 
business (Ben Ali 1997; Cammett 2007). Finally, foreign-owned agricultural 
property was to be expropriated and distributed among Moroccan landown-
ers—however, only those with high connections within the state administra-
tion benefitted from the agrarian reform (Swearingen 1987).
These economic transformations were reinforced by a reconfiguration of 
state power, developing new forms of coercion and consent. A new security 
chief was appointed as Minister of Interior, the civilian Driss Basri. He be-
came the main architect behind the infamous ‘years of lead’. Until the early 
1990s, Hassan II leaned on his civil security apparatus to violently repress 
the political opposition, leading to the arrest, torture, imprisonment, disap-
pearance and murder of tens of thousands of political activists. At the same 
time, the king also realized the importance of active consent for the stability 
and effectiveness of his rule. Parliament and a multiparty system were rein-
stated, which granted a democratic legitimacy to the monarchy’s reforms and 
created a space where loyal opponents could be recruited and disloyal forces 
isolated. Hassan II turned to the nationalist movement, including the leftist 
UNFP (which was severely repressed during the 1960s), to include them in a 
new political consensus.
Last but not the least, the monarchy’s hegemony and prestige were 
strengthened through a renewal of its historical anti-colonial leadership. In 
1975, Hassan II called for a peaceful mass march to ‘liberate’ the Spanish 
Sahara, which resulted in the famous ‘Green March’, mobilizing almost half 
a million people and effectively winning the support of the nationalist opposi-
tion parties (Pennel 2003: 173). The campaign resulted in a war with the Pop-
ular Front for the Liberation of the Sahara and the Rio de Oro (POLISARIO), 
which was partly concluded in 1979 with a very costly occupation. Despite 
the devastating effect on the national budget, the political gains were pivotal 
for Hassan II. The political opposition was effectively neutralized at a time 
when the economic and social conditions were worsening. Consequently, 
when the first austerity measures were introduced at the end of the 1970s, the 
‘locus of contestation shifted to the streets, where it has remained ever since’ 
(Maghraoui 2002: 26).
While Egypt was leaving the path of state-driven accumulation in the 
1970s, Moroccan state intervention increased throughout this decade. How-
ever, the absence of durable and extensive rent revenues limited the mon-
archy’s capacities to bind public loyalties on the basis of a rentier social 
contract (Leveau 1997). Already in 1975, the rentier aspect of the Moroccan 
economy was largely exhausted. The sharp fall in export earnings from phos-
phates and the crisis in the agricultural sector led to a sharp increase of the 
public deficit.
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Despite the introduction of the first austerity measures at the end of the 
1970s, foreign public debt increased from 19.6 per cent of GDP in 1975 to a 
staggering 85 per cent in 1983 (Cohen and Jaïdi 2006: 37). In 1983, Morocco 
turned again to the IMF for support and a structural adjustment programme 
was implemented. The following neoliberal restructurings of the 1980s and 
1990s coincided with a decline in real and relative incomes and put further 
pressure on the stability of the royal bloc. As the material dimension of 
hegemony crumbled, neoliberal restructurings prompted massive protests. 
‘Bread-riots’ broke out in 1981 in Casablanca, after a general strike organized 
by one of the most powerful trade unions in the country. They were heavily 
repressed. Nevertheless, a new countrywide wave of protests followed in 
1984, starting in Marrakech due to another rise in consumer goods prices. The 
revolts quickly spread to more than 50 cities. Six years later, a new general 
strike on 14 December 1990 set the beginning of another violent explosion. 
This time it originated in Fez and then spread to the cities of Tangiers, Kenitra 
and Meknes.
Despite the fact that the monarchy successfully managed to weaken the 
influence of the trade unions through repression and co-optation, especially 
after the 1981 riots (Clément and Paul 1984), protests persisted in massive 
numbers and the state was confronted with another opponent: a rapidly grow-
ing Islamist movement (Pennel 2003: 175–180). In order to maintain the 
monarchy’s rule, a new process of passive revolution was needed, forcing 
Hassan II to start a gradual political ‘reform’ process in the 1990s.
MUBARAK’S NEOLIBERAL OFFENSIVE
In Egypt, from the second half of the 1980s onwards, due to a fall in rental 
income and unproductive distributive policies, national debt rose to more 
than $38 billion in foreign obligation and the budgetary deficit increased to 
over 20 per cent (Richards and Waterbury 2008: 225). The combination of 
a domestic crisis of rent-based accumulation with foreign pressure by the 
United States, IMF and World Bank shifted the state’s gradual and careful 
molecular passive revolution back to a confrontational strategy (Farah 2009: 
41). In 1991 Egypt accepted an Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment 
Program (ERSAP), which aimed to contain and decrease foreign debt and 
inflation, by cutting state subsidies on consumer goods, privatizing public 
companies, liberalizing markets and prices, freezing wages, commercializing 
agricultural lands and implementing a flat tax.
Such neoliberal policies required the further exclusion of subaltern forces 
from wealth redistribution and the subduing of recalcitrant factions of the 
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capitalist class (Roccu 2013). However, the capitalist offensive was not 
grounded within new forms of hegemony; on the contrary, the aggressive 
class confrontation went hand in hand with a decrease in leadership and 
prestige of the dominant groups. The ruling class coalition was restricted 
instead of expanded, and already co-opted allies and opponents were alien-
ated. Firstly, bureaucratic layers in the NDP and the public sector and the 
higher echelons of the armed forces felt a deep resentment towards the ris-
ing faction of neoliberal ‘cronies’ around Gamal Mubarak, the President’s 
son. Secondly, workers, peasants and young graduates were increasingly 
excluded from the neoliberal class alliance. The ERSAP restored economic 
growth and the rate of profit by decreasing wages and benefits, by exploiting 
workers in the private sector, and by expropriating farmlands and increasing 
the prices of land rent. (Farah 2009: 41, 44; Mitchell 1999: 463). Thirdly, 
the limited spaces for opposition within the political and civil spheres were 
further restricted. From 1990 onwards, direct state regulation of political and 
civil society increased: parties’ internal affairs were supervised, professional 
syndicates were put under direct state control, NGOs were closely scrutinized 
and newspapers faced stricter rules of censorship. Ironically, such measures 
severely restricted the capacity of the state to absorb and regulate political 
opponents, making them search for other ways to wage opposition.
Moreover, neoliberal policies did not solve Egypt’s economic problems; on 
the contrary, their implementation worsened an already existing crisis of capi-
tal accumulation. In the countryside, the state sought the support of wealthy 
landowners in the realization of the free trade policies backed by the IMF and 
World Bank by promoting the production of cash crops that could be sold on 
the world market (Abdin and Gaafar 2010: 14). However, as rural capitalists 
were loath to make high-risk, capital-intensive investments in the productivity 
of agriculture, they were more interested in low-risk, inexpensive and often 
violent methods to drive up the rate of exploitation (Mitchell 2006).
In the industrial sector, the privatization of the public sector aimed to 
establish an ensemble of competitive and productive private entrepreneurs. 
However, the combination of global neoliberalism with collapsing state-
driven capitalism resulted in a strengthening of oligarchic and monopolistic 
tendencies. State elites became investors in large private sector enterprises 
or used state power to favour their friends and families in the subcontracting 
sector, realizing huge profits. Public holding companies remained the largest 
shareholders in many of the privatized enterprises. State holding companies 
set up private corporations or joint ventures, and in 1998 the state bought 
back shares in most of its privatized enterprises (Mitchell 2002: 280–282). 
Neoliberal reform in Egypt did not at all entail a retreat of an abstract ‘state’ 
from an abstract ‘market’, but a redirection of state power and resources to-
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wards an increased accumulation of capital achieved by an aggressive policy 
of dispossession, which benefitted only a small clique within the ruling 
classes (Mitchell 1999: 461–462; Naguib 2011).
A crucial element in maintaining hegemony is the perception that the state 
and the ruling group are capable of realizing the ‘common good’. Oligarchic 
economic reform, everyday state violence against ordinary citizens, faltering 
support for the Palestinian cause, and feeble opposition against the Afghani-
stan, Iraq and Lebanon wars discredited the Mubarak regime in the eyes of a 
majority of the population. The state undermined the material base of its con-
sent-generating class compromise while at the same time restricting access 
to the ruling coalition and dissolving spaces where opposition forces could 
be regulated and co-opted. Hence, the 25 January Revolution was rendered 
possible by a deep crisis of hegemony in combination with the existence of 
protest movements that already operated outside the state.
Broadly three forms of resistance emerged. Firstly, throughout the 1980s 
and 1990s, there was a steady growth of a diversity of Islamic movements, 
ranging from puritanical Salafist organizations, over jihadist cells, to the 
Muslim Brotherhood. In the 1990s the threat of Islamic fundamentalism 
was appropriated by the Egyptian state as a defensive raison d’être. Western 
governments and the enfeebled domestic secular opposition were invited to 
support the Mubarak regime as the lesser evil against a radical theocratic en-
emy. Attacks and assassinations by terrorist organizations such as the Islamic 
Group gave the government an excuse to repress the Brotherhood. From 1995 
onwards, Brotherhood activists, student leaders and members of parliament 
were systematically arrested, intimidated, detained and tortured. However, 
despite its illegal status and its continuous harassment by the security forces, 
the Brotherhood was allowed not only to run its candidates in the sham elec-
tions, but also to become the biggest opposition in parliament, especially 
during the elections of 2000 and 2005 (Zemni and Bogaert 2009). Apart from 
constituting a form of resistance, Islamism functioned as the state’s ‘negative 
hegemony’, reminding the population of the fundamentalist alternative to the 
Mubarak regime.
A second movement focused on universal civil and human rights and the 
issue of democratization. The rise of independent NGOs defending civil and 
human rights and hosting meetings of political movements and parties in the 
1990s resulted in a hub of democratic opposition. From the year 2000 on-
wards this civil-democratic movement entered its second phase. Students or-
ganized massive demonstrations in Cairo in support of the Second Palestinian 
Intifada—collective actions ‘from below’ that ended two decades of political 
demobilization. These mobilizations became a platform for political discus-
sion, coordination and cooperation between leftist, Nasserist and Islamist 
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activists (Abdelrahman 2009: 42–44). The war in Afghanistan and the loom-
ing intervention in Iraq gave a new impetus to the development of the exist-
ing solidarity networks. At the end of 2004 the first explicitly anti-Mubarak 
demonstration was organized with the central slogan of free and democratic 
presidential elections. In February 2005 Kefaya (Enough) was established 
as a unitary movement of existing committees and campaigns. At first, the 
state attempted to co-opt the movement, but as the protests grew in numbers 
and militancy, it reverted to a violent repression of democratic activists. 
Moreover, the state preempted one of the chief demands of the movement 
by changing the constitution itself so the president could be elected directly. 
This minor correction to the political system effectively took the wind out of 
Kefaya’s sails. Moreover, the civil-democratic movement failed to construct 
a hegemony of its own and forge structural connections between its core of 
students, intellectuals and urban middle-class groups, and other subaltern 
agents: workers, farmers and the urban poor. Nevertheless, the experience 
had laid the foundations of a network of democratic activists that would grow 
over the years and initiate the first protests of the 25 January Revolution in 
2011 (De Smet 2015).
A third movement consisted of social protests around class- and commu-
nity-based problems. In the countryside, by the mid-1990s, half of the rural 
population lived in poverty, an increase of 10 per cent in comparison to 1990 
(Mitchell 1999: 463). Neoliberal reform stimulated a rise in land rents and 
the concentration of landed property. Landless and small landholding farmers 
reacted with numerous land occupations and protests over the next decade, 
which were violently repressed by landowners and security forces (Bush 
2007). Similarly, the process of privatization and deterioration of workers’ 
livelihoods induced a surge of labour conflicts, but until the mid-2000s these 
protests remained short lived and could not forge connections between dif-
ferent workplaces. The 2003 cabinet of Ahmed Nazif further intensified the 
privatization and liberalization process, stimulating not only an increase in 
labour protests, but also a development of workers’ actions towards indepen-
dent trade unionism, which constituted one of the pillars of the 25 January 
Revolution (De Smet 2015; Zemni, De Smet and Bogaert 2013).
MOROCCO’S PREEMPTED REVOLUTION
This deep crisis of hegemony contrasted sharply with Morocco’s efforts to 
build a new one in the 1990s and 2000s. Confronted with budgetary and 
financial constraints, growing social unrest and personal illness, King Has-
san II set out on a path of gradual political reforms during the 1990s. This 
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process of ‘democratization from above’ intended to expand the base of the 
ruling bloc and reinvigorate the monarchy’s hegemony by reasserting its 
position as the supreme arbiter over the nation’s politics. First of all, Hassan 
II started a personal campaign around human rights. He liberated politi-
cal prisoners, closed ‘secret’ detention centres, founded a state-sponsored 
Council on Human Rights in May 1990 and installed a Minister of Human 
Rights in 1993 (Brand 1998; Zemni and Bogaert 2006). These measures 
were inspired not only by the need to address internal unrest and political 
instability, but also by a drive for greater respectability in the international 
community—especially in Europe and the United States. By the end of 
the 1990s, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch reported that 
Morocco dramatically improved its human rights record, while the World 
Bank lauded the country as being one of the ‘success stories’ of reform in 
the region (Zemni and Bogaert 2006).
The second and more crucial constituent of what became known as the 
alternance process was the inclusion of the historical opposition into the gov-
ernment after the parliamentary elections in 1997. On 4 February 1998, the 
leader of the USFP, Abderrahman Youssoufi, was appointed prime minister. 
The USFP formed a government together with the Istiqlal and other political 
parties. This political opening sparked the hope, not only among foreign ob-
servers, but also among many Moroccans themselves, that a genuine process 
of democratization was under way.
Mohammed VI, who ascended the throne in 1999, further expanded the 
political reform process. He immediately proved his willingness to reform by 
getting rid of the widely despised and hated minister of interior, Driss Basri, 
and acknowledging the government’s responsibility during the ‘years of lead’ 
(Vermeren 2002). Mohammed VI launched several social development ini-
tiatives and repeatedly stressed the importance of good governance, human 
rights, economic development and citizen participation. This sudden change 
in style, compared with the more repressive image of his father Hassan II, 
even earned him the reputation of ‘king of the poor’.
These careful policies of co-optation and negotiation constituted a cru-
cial difference with the confrontational capitalist offensive in Egypt. The 
Moroccan monarchy established a radical break with the ‘years of lead’, 
creating a new hegemonic momentum centred on gradual democratic re-
form and just kingship, winning over domestic and international support. 
Although the optimism of a ‘Moroccan exception’ experienced a setback 
after the suicide bombings in Casablanca in May 2003, many observers still 
praised the country’s economic openness to the rest of the world (Zemni 
2006; Cavatorta 2007). They believed, for example, that the implementa-
tion of important social policies such as the National Initiative for Human 
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Development (INDH) and the Cities Without Slums Program testified that 
there was still evidence of a real transition towards more political liberaliza-
tion (e.g. Navez-Bouchanine 2009).
Despite these reform efforts, protest in Morocco did not cease or even dimin-
ish. Quite similar to Egypt, three intertwined forms of resistance can be distin-
guished. First, the Islamists grew stronger, both the legalized Party for Justice 
and Development (PJD) and the unrecognized, but tolerated, movement Al-Adl 
wal-Ihsan (Justice and Charity). The Islamists demonstrated that, if necessary, 
they were capable of mobilizing a massive crowd. At demonstrations in solidar-
ity with Palestine, against the invasion of Iraq or in opposition to the reform 
of the Family Code in 2004, Islamist movements, especially Al-Adl wal-Ihsan, 
mobilized close to a million people each time (Cavatorta 2007).
Second, as in Egypt, Morocco witnessed the growth of civil and human 
rights movements. The process of alternance, the increasing attention given 
in the West to issues of democratization and the role of civil society and 
the accession of Mohammed VI to the throne opened up political space for 
human rights movements, neighbourhood associations and women’s move-
ments to become active and offered many secular and leftist activists—who 
had experienced repression during the ‘years of lead’—a way to be politically 
active outside party politics and militant trade unionism. A salient example 
was the Moroccan Association of Human Rights (AMDH). The AMDH has 
gathered older leftist militants that were active in radical student movements, 
trade unions and leftists parties in the 1970s and 1980s, and younger activ-
ists, many of whom were/are active in the 20 February Movement. Today, 
the organization has approximately 12,000 listed members and over 90 local 
sections spread over the country.
Finally, ever since the urban riots of the 1980s, the country has been 
confronted with economic protests and struggles around class issues. From 
the early 1990s onwards, unemployed graduates mobilized on a regular and 
structural basis, and since the establishment of the Moroccan National As-
sociation of Unemployed Graduates (ANDCM) in 1991, unemployed gradu-
ates have become a permanent and highly visible feature of the social protest 
landscape in Morocco. Many activists within ANDCM were and are closely 
connected to the left, and they consider their economic situation and unem-
ployment as the economic dimension of authoritarianism and the result of a 
‘class policy’ (Emperador 2013: 5). Other groups of unemployed graduates, 
more prominent in the bigger cities, have taken a more pragmatic stance and 
mobilized around the notion of a ‘right to work’. They demand their ‘right’ 
to be employed in the public sector, reinvigorating the old developmentalist 
social contract granting university graduates access to the public sector (Bo-
gaert and Emperador 2011).
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Furthermore, there was a significant increase in local economic protests 
all over the country in the mid-2000s (Bogaert 2015). These protests were 
diverse and demonstrators expressed demands particular to their predica-
ment, for example, access to public jobs, better infrastructure (roads, houses, 
etc.) and lack of support after natural disasters (earthquakes, floods), or they 
denounced the continuous price hikes of consumption goods like water and 
electricity. Yet, these struggles were not merely ‘socioeconomic’ but also 
about public services, the question of ownership over national resources 
and the redistribution of wealth; in other words, about fundamental political 
questions.
There was an attempt, from the mid-2000s onwards, to bring these scat-
tered protests together in a more structured coordination: the ‘movement 
against the high cost of living’. AMDH, one of the movement’s protagonists, 
managed to set up more than 80 active local committees or tansikiyat spread 
around the country. Both AMDH and the local tansikiyat actively supported 
the 20 February movement in 2011, and together with the Islamists of Al-Adl 
wal-Ihsan, they guaranteed its success during the first months. The monar-
chy’s ‘benign’ passive revolution entailed a calculated retreat from its explic-
itly dominating position in certain spheres of civil and political society since 
the 1980s. By creating and delimiting the terrain for oppositional politics, the 
monarchy was able to channel discontent along lines it could control. While 
these passive revolutionary policies were generally successful in absorbing 
the traditional opposition parties and trade unions into the monarchy’s coali-
tion, they also opened up space for organizations and movements that escaped 
the royal hegemony, such as Al-Adl wal-Ihsan, the AMDH and, eventually, 
the 20 February Movement. In the wake of the revolutions in Egypt and 
Tunisia, the 20 February movement succeeded in organizing regular mass 
demonstrations in more than 50 cities and towns throughout the country, 
especially during the first months of its existence.
However, in comparison with Egypt and Tunisia, the response of the gen-
eral population to the anti-regime protests was rather gradual and cautious 
(Molina 2011). One of the reasons was that the monarchy, instead of repress-
ing these mobilizations, appropriated popular initiative by announcing con-
stitutional reform on 9 March, less than three weeks after the first nationwide 
protests. This was one of the main demands of the movement. A new constitu-
tion was implemented only a few months later through a national referendum. 
Nevertheless, despite the fact that the monarchy managed to drown the 20 
February movement in its politics of consent and restore political stabilization 
in the short term, in the long run the movement might have planted the seed of 
a more profound counter-hegemonic project. In this regard, the 20 February 
Movement did not represent an actual parallel to Egypt’s revolutionary mass 
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uprising, but rather its ‘Kefaya moment’. And even though it equally failed 
to forge connections with the broader society (e.g. unemployed graduates, 
workers, farmers, the urban poor, etc.), the movement dared to question the 
political, economic and moral dimensions of the ‘royal hegemony’.
REFORM AND REVOLUTION IN NEOLIBERAL TIMES
This chapter set out to investigate the histories behind the different out-
comes of the Arab uprisings in Egypt and in Morocco. Whereas by 2011, 
relatively large protest movements were still nibbling at Morocco’s royal 
hegemony, Egypt’s state was falling into an organic crisis, in which almost 
all state institutions, except for the armed forces and the judiciary, had been 
discredited in the eyes of the masses. We suggested that an explanation for 
this dichotomy is to be found in the different pace, intensity and character of 
national articulations of a global neoliberal history. Studying the impact of 
neoliberal reform in relation to authoritarianism and the uprisings implies that 
we understand how ‘the global’ is always grounded and how authoritarian-
ism—capitalist state power—is transformed in relation to global shifts, on the 
one hand, and particular interests, specific balances of power, struggle and 
resistance, on the other.
Our analysis shows that there was an important difference between the po-
sition of the Moroccan monarchy and the Egyptian presidency, the two core 
institutions of state power in these countries. In Egypt the post-1919 process 
of passive-revolutionary decolonization was largely unsuccessful, leading 
to a second rupture in 1952, which led to a more complex authoritarianism 
rooted in a broad social base.3 Conversely, the Moroccan case represents a 
more gradual, negotiated process of decolonization: a successful passive rev-
olution in which the colonial domestic elites—the sultan and the rural land-
lords—remained the dominant groups within the postcolonial state. While 
Nasser had to ground his hegemony in a myth of revolution and discontinuity 
with the ‘feudal’ past and ‘imperialist’ present, Mohammed V personified the 
continuity of the Moroccan nation—even in the face of postcolonialism. The 
Moroccan king was able to combine ‘modern’ anti-colonial legitimacy with 
his ‘traditional’ political and religious prestige and leadership of the king as 
the Commander of the Faithful.
Both states embarked on a project of developmentalism after their de-
colonization. In Egypt, during the heydays of the Nasserist regime, the state 
became the primary agent of capital accumulation through the development 
of a large industrial public sector. State-led industrialization and redistribu-
tion was, besides the development of an impressive security apparatus, a 
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core element within the construction of a developmentalist and Arab social-
ist hegemony. The economic crisis in the second half of the 1960s and the 
defeat in the Six Day War undermined the material and ideological base of 
Nasserism. In order to attract foreign capital, ruling elites led by President 
Sadat forcefully reconfigured the dominant class alliances and accumulation 
strategy along neoliberal lines. The implementation of IMF austerity mea-
sures in 1977 provoked a general uprising, the first bread riots in the region. 
Throughout the 1980s, President Mubarak was able to slow down neoliberal 
reform and its concomitant confrontational politics, by leaning on the largely 
‘external’ factor of geopolitical and economic rents. Yet, the fiscal crisis of 
the second half of the 1980s forced the state to go back on the offensive, de-
ploying an aggressive strategy of accumulation by dispossession in the 1990s 
and 2000s. Combined with intensified oppression and exclusion of political 
opponents and subaltern groups, these policies further undermined the hege-
mony of the ruling classes, leading to the buildup of the revolutionary process 
and the uprising in January and February 2011.
In Morocco, the hegemony of the ruling bloc was never constructed around 
a universalist socialist or developmentalist myth, but around the monarchy 
as a particular, Moroccan institution representing the nation and its religion. 
Furthermore, the Moroccan state never became the primary motor of capital 
accumulation—only its facilitator. Moroccanization did not entail a large-
scale nationalization of foreign firms, as happened in Egypt after the Suez 
War in 1956 and with the Socialist Decrees of 1961, but a strategy to support 
the private sector and tie it to the regime. The state transferred surpluses and 
profits to the private sector and absorbed most of the investment risks. This 
was both out of necessity, due to a weak private sector, and to integrate dif-
ferent groups of elites into royal patronage. Thus, the monarchy was able to 
regulate economic life and reap its benefits, while largely escaping from the 
need to take responsibility for its shortcomings. Conversely, an economic cri-
sis did not automatically endanger the hegemonic position of the monarchy.
When confronted with severe social unrest and a succession of nationwide 
riots and protest in the 1980s, the monarchy fell back on harsh repression to 
restore order and political stability. Recognizing the long-term dangers of 
such confrontational politics for the royal institution, Hassan II embarked 
on a gradual reform process: alternance. This ‘benign’ passive revolution 
restored the monarchy’s hegemony and cleared the path for Mohammed VI 
to succeed his father. Mohammed VI predominantly focused on economic 
reform and provided the monarchy, for the time being, with a sufficiently 
strong hegemonic position to prevent the 20 February Movement and other 
protests to turn into a revolutionary mass movement.
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In the end, Egypt’s ‘revolution against neoliberalism’ (Armbrust 2011) 
was successfully deferred in Morocco, not necessarily because neoliberal-
ism’s ‘objective’ social consequences were less harsh or protests were less 
numerous or strong, but because the monarchy managed to maintain hege-
monic power, generating sufficient consent among the population to continue 
its rule. In Egypt, the power of the presidency was undermined by its failure 
to maintain the material (redistribution), political (broad class alliances) and 
ideological (moral and cultural leadership) dimensions of hegemony. This, 
in Trotsky’s words, ‘did not exclude the possibility of revolution, but, on the 
contrary, made revolution the only way out’ (Trotsky 2007: 30).
NOTES
1. An earlier version of this paper with the title ‘Kings, Pharaohs and Neoliberal-
ism: Passive Revolution and Resistance in Egypt and Morocco’ was presented at 
the conference Contentions Against Neoliberalism: Reconstituting the Social Fabric 
in the Developing World at the Oxford Department of International Development 
(ODID), 27–28 June 2013, Oxford University, UK.
2. See also Özden, Akça and Bekmen; Springer; and Lim in this volume.
3. See De Smet (2016) for an extensive discussion.
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